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영어를 공부하는 학생은 물론 양심적인 시민으로 살고 싶어하는 분들께 코리아타임스를 권하는 이유는 제가 거기에 칼럼을 쓰고 있어서가 아닙니다. 바로 오늘 아침 1면에 실린 것과 같이 재미 있고 의미 있는 기사들이 자주 실리기 때문입니다. 제목은 'S. Korea's 'funny media' and North Korean politics'입니다.
한 마디로 정리하면 한국의 언론이 웃긴다는 것입니다. 한국의 언론은 정치인들을 강경파, 온건파로 규정 짓는 걸 좋아하는데, 그게 전혀 사실과 맞지 않는다는 겁니다. 최근에 통일부 장관으로 임명된 유우익 씨를 온건파라고 하며, 그가 통일부 장관이 되었으니 앞으로 남북한 관계에서 한국 정부가 '유연한' 태도를 보일 거라고 하는데 웃기는 얘기라는 겁니다.
한국언론은 유우익 씨가 주중국 대사일 때 한국과 중국 관계가 원만하게 유지되게 했다고 하는데 실제로는 전혀 그렇지 않았습니다. 당시에 천안함 사건과 연평도 포격 사건이 발생해 한중 관계가 1992년 외교관계 수립이후 최악이었는데, 그 이유는 양국 정부간의 '소통 부족'이었다는 겁니다.
유우익 씨의 임명으로 남북한 관계가 개선될 것이라고 선전하는 보수 언론, 아무래도 내년에 있을 국회의원 선거와 대통령 선거를 의식해 정부 편을 들고 있는 것 같다는 것입니다. 한 번 읽어 보시지요.
S, Korea's 'funny media' and North Korean politics
“The South Korean media is funny. Since when was Yu Woo-ik a dove?” said a person who knows Yu personally.
“The South Korean media has a habit of putting politicians either in a hawk or dove basket when it comes to North Korea. Now, they say Yu is a dove. Well, that’s really news to me,” said the person, who was visiting China.
For days, the media has been buzzing over whether President Lee Myung-bak’s appointment of Yu as a new unification minister would signal a “turning point” in Lee’s policy toward the North. Yu has replaced hardliner Hyun In-taek.
On the surface, that’s how it all appears. In unusual unison, media outlets from both the left and right, all expressed predictions leaning toward such an interpretation.
Decoding the motivations behind the progressive media outlets is easy. For them, inter-Korean relations under Hyun’s helm couldn’t have been worse. They see the “exit” of Hyun, naturally, as progress.
Importantly, by trumpeting Yu’s induction and characterizing him as someone “flexible” in his approach to North Korea, they have preemptively shaped public sentiment that would expect Yu to behave accordingly. In media studies, this is called “framing.” It is a process of influencing the individual’s perception of meanings attributed to words or phrases. By framing Yu as a “dove,” it encourages the public to expect Yu to behave that way.
Decoding the conservative media is more complicated. They even got a few facts wrong about Yu’s performance in China. A conservative newspaper, for example, described Yu as someone “who smoothly coordinated Seoul-Beijing ties as ambassador.”
Many interlocutors, both Chinese and Korean, will robustly dispute such a view. The Cheonan and Yeonpeyong incidents happened while Yu served as President Lee Myung-bak’s top diplomat to China. Bilateral ties nose-dived to their lowest point since the two established diplomatic relations in 1992. At that time, pundits also pointed out the “communication gap” between Seoul and Beijing.
The National Assembly Foreign Relations Committee, which evaluated Yu’s candidacy for the new post, attached an opinion in its report that stated: “During Yu’s service as ambassador to China, his contribution to establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula was ‘lacking.’”
The real intention for the conservative media to hype Yu was aimed at South Korea’s domestic politics, not North Korea. The country will elect new members of the Assembly in April 2012 and a new president in December 2012. Voters have been increasingly disenchanted by Lee’s hardline posture on the North. Even Hong Jun-pyo, head of Lee’s own Grand National Party (GNP), demanded the need for toning down the posture, sensing the uneasiness in voter sentiment.
The appointment of Yu reflects Lee’s accommodation of such views ahead of the elections. But it is a shift in tactics, not strategy toward the North. Most hardliners are still at Cheong Wa Dae. Hyun, known to be the architect of Lee’s hardline North Korea policy and the hawk of hawks, has simply changed his office from the unification ministry to the presidential office. He now has a new job as Lee’s inter-Korean affairs advisor.
Essentially, Lee’s shuffling of unification minister is window dressing to woo a wider constituency that would benefit the GNP in the elections. Lee was elected on a pledge to get tough on North Korea. Lee’s loyal support group still remains conservative. The last thing Lee wants to do is to alienate them.
With 70 percent of Lee’s tenure already over, “a dramatic policy shift at this stage would undermine his own presidency,” noted Jo Dong-ho at Ewha Womans University.
In fact, the government’s new tactic was spelled out by Yu himself, who in his inaugural speech last week said he would try to “create an atmosphere for dialogue.” The keyword here is “atmosphere.” It’s the appearance of displaying to the public a willingness to engage North Korea, but that is different from actual engagement that brings about substantial changes.
The Lee administration will issue a series of charm offensives toward the North, such as “possibly” building a second Gaeseong Industrial Complex or resuming humanitarian aid. Lee’s team may also resort to a rhetorical statement such as “there is no reason we cannot consider an inter-Korean summit.” Media outlets will deliver the statements to the public. Yet the primary concern for all this lip service is not about North Korea per se, but to influence voter psychology.
If North Korea doesn’t react positively to Lee and Yu’s warming gestures, “the Lee administration can simply blame North Korea for its ‘unresponsiveness’ and justify why Seoul has to continue to maintain its hardline policy,” said a former senior official who worked for the Lee administration, reflecting the sentiment within the government.
Jo sees that there is still room for genuine change in Lee’s policy toward North Korea.
“As a new unification minister in charge of inter-Korean relations, Yu will naturally want to differentiate himself from his predecessor. If Yu’s policy on North Korea is the same as that of Hyun, there would have been no reason for Yu to replace Hyun,” said Jo.
Pundits say Yu, a close confidant of President Lee, can become the most powerful unification minister in South Korea’s history if he wants. Indeed, Yu can pitch his role as a “team player” with other hawks at the Blue House or decide to choose to build his own legacy. The outcome will be likely negotiated in Yu’s private conversations with Lee. |